Good actors appear to become their characters, making them come alive, as if they were real. Is this because they have succeeded in merging themselves with their character? Are there any positive or negative psychological effects of this experience? We examined the role of three characteristics that may make this kind of merging possible: dissociation, flow, and empathy. We also examined the relation of these characteristics to acting quality. Acting students and non-acting students completed a dissociation measure, and then performed (...) a monologue that was recorded and rated on the dimensions of acting. Participants were then reassessed on dissociation to determine whether it increased as a function of performance. They were also then assessed on flow and empathy. Actors did not differ from non-actors on dissociation, but did score significantly higher than non-actors on some flow and empathy subscales, indicating a positive psychological experience and outcome. While non-actors’ dissociation marginally increased post-performance, actors’ dissociation rose significantly, which could indicate a negative psychological experience. Surprisingly, acting ratings were unrelated to the levels of dissociation, flow, or empathy. We concluded that, while these are tools used by actors to immerse themselves fully in their characters, they may not be necessary to create the illusion of an imaginary character come to life on stage. (shrink)

Le regain d’intérêt de ces derniers temps pour la philosophie présocratique est avant tout perceptible dans le nombre d’ouvrages collectifs importants dont cette période de l’histoire de la pensée fait l’objet depuis une dizaine d’années. Les divers « companions », « handbooks » et autres collections d’études qui lui sont consacrées, sans oublier les actes des Symposia Praesocratica, qui visent l’explora­tion suivie de ce domaine, donnent une idée de la complexification croissante des problém...

Sous la forme d’une vaste question, « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie présocratique? », le premier Symposium Praesocraticum, tenu à Lille en 2000 à l’initiative d’André Laks et publié en 2002 par A. Laks et C. Louguet aux Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, avait analysé la légitimité controversée de cette catégorie de l’historiographie philosophique. Face à la profusion de démarches intellectuelles qui voit le jour dans la Grèce du vie siècle av. J.-C., est-il possible de dégager quelque ch...

From the most prominent thinkers in Latin American philosophy, literature, politics, and social science comes a challenge to conventional theories of globalization. The contributors to this volume imagine a discourse in which revolution requires no temporalized march of progress or takeovers of state power but instead aims at local control and the material conditions for human dignity.

El trabajo constituye un homenaje a Leopoldo Zea, preparado a instancias de su colega y amigo Arturo Roig, con el propósito de resaltar la metodología y hábitos de trabajo de Leopoldo, relacionando su labor intelectual con su vida cotidiana. En este sentido se destacan su memoria prodigiosa y el hecho de que su trabajo estuviera condicionado por su personalidad. Era un intelectual intuitivo, con gran capacidad de síntesis e ingeniosa réplica para contestar en las numerosas polémicas en que (...) participó. A través de sus libros y de una intensa actividad desplegada en numerosísimos viajes, logró que el interés por América Latina se extendiera por todo el mundo. Siguiendo a Gaos y a Ortega y Gasset, consideraba que es a partir de la propia circunstancia que se puede dar la tarea de entender al mundo. Comprender y comunicar son según Zea, las dos acepciones del término logos, que sirven de fundamento a la filosofía.This work is homage to Leopoldo Zea and was written at the request of his friend and colleague, Arturo Roig, with the purpose of emphasizing Leopoldo's methodology and work habits as an intellectual as well as in his daily life. We can point out his prodigious memory and the consistency of his work with his personality. He was an intuitive intellectual, with a great ability to synthesize and a talent for the witty reply in the numerous debates he took part in. Through his books and travels he extended the interest in Latin America all over the world. Following Gaos and Ortega y Gasset, he believed that understanding one's own circumstances enabled one to understand the world. To understand and to communicate were, according to Zea, the two meanings of logos that serve as a foundation to Philosophy. (shrink)

El artículo se pregunta por el problema del Otro en América Latina, considerando la reflexión de Lévinas y de Ortega y Gasset a partir de la fenomenología de Husserl. El examen recae en dos figuras paradigmáticas de la modernidad barroca: la así denominada Malinche y Juana Inés de la Cruz, teniendo como telón de fondo el debate entre Ginés de Sepúlveda y Bartolomé de las Casas acerca de la humanidad o animalidad de los así llamados indígenas. Se le presta especial (...) atención a las perspectivas adoptadas por Tzvetan Todorov, Leopoldo Zea, Octavio Paz y Bolívar Echeverría sobre las figuras mencionadas. (shrink)

Agustín Serrano de Haro edita y presenta en el volumen colectivo Cuerpo vivido una selección de textos memorables en torno a lo que en 1925 fue denominado programáticamente por Ortega y Gasset una “topografía de nuestra intimidad”. La reflexión fenomenológica acerca del intracuerpo fue un tema que ha preocupado y preocupa de manera notoria a los filósofos cuyos trabajos reúne este colectivo: Ortega y Gasset, José Gaos, Joaquín Xirau, Leopoldo-Eulogio Palacios y Agustín Serrano de Haro. Pese a ello, tal (...) vez no sea tan conocido de todos nosotros el hecho de que las investigaciones filosóficas acerca del cuerpo humano (siempre sentido por uno mismo y reconocido por otros de modo intransferible) resultaron ser contribuciones pioneras y anticipaciones preclaras del tema actual del cuerpo y la corporalidad. (shrink)

Investigamos las movilizaciones a la Plaza de Mayo del 2 y 10 de abril de 1982 por la recuperación de las islas Malvinas; entendemos que ahí hay pistas fundamentales para comprender las complejas relaciones entre los argentinos, la dictadura militar, las Malvinas, Gran Bretaña y las grandes potencias. Analizamos los mensajes del presidente de facto Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri, pronunciados desde el balcón de la Casa Rosada y los diversos modos en que se expresan los manifestantes en la Plaza de (...) Mayo. Son voces producidas en el marco de interacciones dialógicas, voces que discuten, reformulan y/o defienden otras voces, enunciados engendrados a partir de enunciados anteriores, propios y ajenos, que anticipan objeciones y posibles respuestas, que exhiben coincidencias, tensiones y disidencias entre los participantes. El análisis de estos discursos permite dar cuenta de cómo los sujetos se representan las tareas del momento que viven y le dan respuesta movilizando sus matrices ideológico discursivas, adecuándolas a los nuevos desafíos. Presentamos resultados parciales de una investigación en curso. (shrink)

Partindo das reflexões de Franklin Leopoldo e Silva, procuraremos recuperar alguns fragmentos da experiência da Maria Antônia de modo a compreendê-la em sua densidade histórica, qual seja, enquanto vivência concreta marcada pela experiência de pertencimento ao tempo presente e como transgressão dos limites do estabelecido. Num segundo momento, buscaremos refletir sobre a ambiguidade dessa experiência como “abertura de possíveis” e “perda do irrealizado”. Isso nos levará à necessidade de questionar o “presentismo” e o fenômeno de adaptação que lhe é (...) inerente, propondo assim uma reelaboração crítica das relações entre passado e presente, isto é, da experiência histórica, a partir da qual o acontecimento Maria Antônia pode ser atualizado sob a perspectiva de uma crítica do presente. (shrink)

Resenha: REIMER, Ivoni. Maria, Jesus e Paulo com as mulheres : textos, interpretações e história. São Leopoldo: CEBI; São Paulo: Paulus, 2013. 101p.

Are there nonexistent objects, i.e., objects that do not exist? Some examples often cited are: Zeus, Pegasus, Sherlock Holmes, Vulcan (the hypothetical planet postulated by the 19th century astronomer Le Verrier), the perpetual motion machine, the golden mountain, the fountain of youth, the round square, etc. Some important philosophers have thought that the very concept of a nonexistent object is contradictory (Hume) or logically ill-formed (Kant, Frege), while others (Leibniz, Meinong, the Russell of Principles of Mathematics) have embraced it wholeheartedly. (...) This entry is an examination of the many questions which arise in connection with the view that there are nonexistent objects. The following are particularly salient: What reasons are there (if any) for thinking that there are nonexistent objects? If there are nonexistent objects, then what kind of objects are they? How can they be characterized? Is it possible to provide a consistent theory of nonexistent objects? What is the explanatory force of a consistent theory of nonexistent objects (if such a thing is possible)? (shrink)

In the past thirty years or so, the doctrine that actions are events has become an essential, and sometimes unargued, part of the received view in the philosophy of action, despite the efforts of a few philosophers to undermine the consensus. For example, the entry for Agency in a recently published reference guide to the philosophy of mind begins with the following sentence: A central task in the philosophy of action is that of spelling out the differences between events in (...) general and those events that fall squarely into the category of human action. There is no consensus about what events are. But it is generally agreed that, whatever events may prove to be, actions are a species or a class of events. We believe that the received view is mistaken: actions are not events. We concede that for most purposes, the kind of categorial refinement which is involved in either affirming or denying that actions are events is frankly otiose. Our common idiom does not stress the difference between actions and events, at least not in general terms, because it has no need to. Perhaps it sounds a little odd to say that some events are performed; but if we balked at describing, say, the abdication of Edward VIII as one of the politically significant events in Britain in 1936, it could not be for metaphysical reasons. And since actions, like events, are datable — though often, as we shall see, only imprecisely — actions are said to take place and to occur. But an important class of actions consist in moving something; indeed, according to many philosophers, every action consists in moving something. And when we consider actions of this sort from a theoretical point of view it becomes imperative to distinguish between actions and events. Or so we shall argue. (shrink)

Understanding human beings and their distinctive rational and volitional capacities requires a clear account of such things as reasons, desires, emotions, and motives, and how they combine to produce and explain human behaviour. Maria Alvarez presents a fresh and incisive study of these concepts, centred on reasons and their role in human agency.

Continuing Franz Boas' work to establish anthropology as an academic discipline in the US at the turn of the twentieth century, Alfred L. Kroeber re-defined culture as a phenomenon sui generis. To achieve this he asked geneticists to enter into a coalition against hereditarian thoughts prevalent at that time in the US. The goal was to create space for anthropology as a separate discipline within academia, distinct from other disciplines. To this end he crossed the boundary separating anthropology from biology (...) in order to secure the boundary. His notion of culture, closely bound to the concept of heredity, saw it as independent of biological heredity (culture as superorganic) but at the same time as a heredity of another sort. The paper intends to summarise the shifting boundaries of anthropology at the beginning of the twentieth century, and to present Kroeber?s ideas on culture, with a focus on how the changing landscape of concepts of heredity influenced his views. The historical case serves to illustrate two general conclusions: that the concept of culture played and plays different roles in explaining human existence; that genetics and the concept of Weismannian hard inheritance did not have an unambiguous unidirectional historical effect on the vogue for hereditarianism at that time; on the contrary, it helped to establish culture in Kroeber's sense, culture as independent of heredity. (shrink)

The article addresses the question whether culture evolves in a Lamarckian manner. I highlight three central aspects of a Lamarckian concept of evolution: the inheritance of acquired characteristics, the transformational pattern of evolution, and the concept of directed changes. A clear exposition of these aspects shows that a system can be a Darwinian variational system instead of a Lamarckian transformational one, even if it is based on inheritance of acquired characteristics and/or on Lamarckian directed changes. On this basis, I apply (...) the three aspects to culture. Taking for granted that culture is a variational system, based on selection processes, I discuss in detail the senses in which cultural inheritance can be said to be Lamarckian and in which sense problem solving, a major factor in cultural change, leads to directed variation. (shrink)

María Lugones, one of the premiere figures in feminist philosophy, has at last collected some of her most famous essays, as well as some lesser-known gems, into her first book.

This chapter contains sections titled: Acosta, José de (1539–1600) Alberdi, Juan Bautista (1810–84) Bello, Andrés (1781–1865) Bilbao, Francisco (1823–65) Bolkvar, Simón (1783–1830) Casas, Bartolomé de las (1484–1566) Caso, Antonio (1883–1946) Cruz, Sor Juana Inés de la (1651–95) da Costa, Newton Carneiro Affonso (b. 1929) Dussel, Enrique (b. 1934) Frondizi, Risieri (1910–83) Gaos, José (1900–69) González Prada, Manuel (1848–1918) Gracia, Jorge J. E. (b. 1942) Haya de la Torre, Victor Raúl (1895–1979) Hostos, Eugenio Marka de (1839–1903) Ingenieros, José (1877–1925) Korn, Alejandro (...) (1860–1936) Lastarria, José Victorino (1817–88) Lemos, Miguel (1854–1917) Mariátegui, José Carlos (1895–1930) Martk, José (1853–95) Méndez Sierra, Justo (1848–1912) Mora, José Maria Luis (1794–1850) Miró Quesada, Francisco (b. 1918) Rabossi, Eduardo (1930–2005) Ramos, Samuel (1897–1959) Rodó, José Enrique (1872–1917) Romero, Francisco (1891–1962) Sahagún, Fray Bernardino de (1499–1590) Salazar Bondy, Augusto (1925–74) Sarmiento, Domingo Faustino (1811–88) Ofelia Schutte (b. 1945) Sepslveda, Juan Ginés de (ca. 1494–1573) Torretti, Roberto (b. 1930) Vasconcelos, José (1882–1959) Vaz Ferreira, Carlos (1872–1958) Villoro, Luis (b. 1922) Vitoria, Francisco de (ca. 1483–1546) Zea Aguilar, Leopoldo (1912–2004) Acknowledgment Further Reading. (shrink)

Two conceptions of motivating reasons, i.e. the reasons for which we act, can be found in the literature: (1) the dominant 'psychological conception', which says that motivating reasons are an agent's believing something; and (2) the 'non-psychological' conception, the minority view, which says that they are what the agent believes, i.e. his beliefs. In this paper I outline a version of the minority view, and defend it against what have been thought to be insuperable difficulties - in particular, difficulties concerning (...) 'error cases' (cases where what the agent believes is false); and difficulties concerning the explanation of action. Concerning error cases, I argue that if we are motivated by something believed that is true, what motivates us to act is a motivating reason. By contrast, if we are motivated by something believed that is false, then what motivates us to act is merely an apparent motivating reason. Either way, what motivates us is, as the non-psychological conception says, what we believe and not our believing it. I offer an account of the relation between motivating reasons and the explanation of action, and argue that this account helps bring out two important points. One is that the fact that we often do, and indeed sometimes must, use explanations such as 'He did it because he believed that p' does not vindicate the psychological conception of motivating reasons. The other is that endorsing the non-psychological conception of motivating reasons does not commit one to a non-factive view of explanations of action. (shrink)

According to Donald Davidson, the very idea of a conceptual scheme is the third dogma of empiricism. In this paper I examine the ways in which this claim may be interpreted. I conclude by arguing that there remains an innocent version of the scheme -content distinction which is not motivated by empiricism and does not commit us to the pernicious type of dualism that Davidson rejects.

Beginning with a historical overview of relativism, from Pythagoras in ancient Greece to Derrida and postmodernism, Maria Baghramian explores the resurgence of relativism throughout the history of philosophy. She then turns to the arguments for and against the many subdivisions of relativism, including Kuhn and Feyerabend's ideas of relativism in science, Rorty's relativism about truth, and the conceptual relativism of Quine and Putnam. Baghramian questions whether moral relativism leads to moral indifference or even nihilism, and whether feminist epistemology's concerns about (...) the very notion of objectivity can be considered a form of relativism. She concludes the relativism debate by assessing the recent criticisms such as Quine's argument from translation and Davidson's claim that even the motivations behind relativism are unintelligible. Finding these criticisms lacking, Baghramian proposes a moderate form of pluralism which addresses the legitimate worries that give rise to relativism without incurring charges of nihilism or anarchy. (shrink)

This work presents an analysis of the feeling of guilt and in particular of the cognitive defenses against it. It shows how the need to avoid or mitigate the feeling, with the suffering implied, affects the perception and judgment of oneself and others. It is in fact claimed that to copy with their guilt people try to alter the appraisal processes implied by the emotion. Once described the main cognitive components of the feeling of guilt, an analysis is offered of (...) the interventions of the cognitive defenses on such components, to alter the original appraisal processes underlying the feeling. (shrink)

In this article we aim to reconstruct some aspects of Davidson's idea of triangulation, and against this reconstruction, ask whether the idea is viciously circular. We begin by looking at the claim that without a triangularn setting, there is no saying what the cause of a being's responses is. In the first section we discuss the notion of relevant similarity, and what difference the presence of a second non‐linguistic being could make for the individuation of a common focus of attention. (...) In the second section we look at the role of a second person in language‐acquisition. It is important that being corrected to ‘go on as others do’ does not yet presuppose thought, and similarity standards can be applied to a learner's reactions even before she is aware of these standards. We also show why Davidson is not committed to any consensus view of correctness. In the last section we discern three charges of circularity that can be levelled against the idea of triangulation. We argue that Davidson can respond to the first two charges, and point to a way of answering the third. But the response we propound raises a new question, namely, why does the second being have to be a speaker or thinker even before the learner is aware of the three points of the triangle? (shrink)

This article considers aspects of a development aid that provides medical support to strengthen pediatric orthopedics in Rwanda. We present part of the Afriquia foundation work, a nonprofit foundation from Poland involved in supporting the medical sector in Rwanda as a sign of global solidarity and the human right to health. The main foundation's activity is the treatment of orthopedic problems among Rwandan citizens. We present a case study of two children under the care of the Afiquia foundation. 11‐year‐old Seraphine (...) treated due to the consequences of right tibia osteomyelitis and 11‐year‐old Lavi suffering from osteogenesis imperfecta. Both children were treated surgically in Poland due to Rwanda's lack of treatment possibilities. After the applied treatment, Seraphine walks correctly without crutches and can attend school and thrive among her peers. Lavi has not sustained any fragility fracture since the surgery in Poland. He is healthy and constantly ongoing his rehabilitation including gait training. The described cases initiated development aid in Rwanda, supplying hospitals with orthopedic implants and training medical staff. The growing number of humanitarian crises across the globe and the people affected requires increasing organizations involved in providing relief. The emphasis should be on global education, aiming to make the recipients reflect and prepare them to face humanitarian crises. (shrink)

Imagining Dewey' features productive (re)interpretations of 21st century experience using the lens of John Dewey's 'Art as Experience', through the doubled task of putting an array of international philosophers, educators, and artists-researchers in transactional dialogue and on equal footing in an academic text. This book is a pragmatic attempt to encourage application of aesthetic learning and living, ekphrasic interpretation, critical art and agonist pluralism.0There are two foci: (a) Deweyan philosophy and educational themes with (b) analysis and examples of how educators, (...) artists, and researchers envision and enact artful meaning making. This structure meets the needs of university and high school audiences, who are accustomed to learning about challenging ideas through multimedia and aesthetic experience.00Contributors are: James M. Albrecht, Adam I. Attwood, John Baldacchino, Carolyn L. Berenato, M. Cristina Di Gregori, Holly Fairbank, Jim Garrison, Amanda Gulla, Bethany Henning, Jessica Heybach, David L. Hildebrand, Ellyn Lyle, Livio Mattarollo, Christy McConnell Moroye, Maria-Isabel Moreno-Montoro, Maria Martinez Morales, Stephen M. Noonan, Louise G. Phillips, Scott L. Pratt, Joaquin Roldan, Leopoldo Rueda, Tadd Ruetenik, Leisa Sasso, Bruce Uhrmacher, David Vessey, Ricardo Marin Viadel, Sean Wiebe, Li Xu and Martha Patricia Espiritu Zavalza. (shrink)

Of all the thinkers of the century of genius that inaugurated modern philosophy, none lived an intellectual life more rich and varied than Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Maria Rosa Antognazza's pioneering biography provides a unified portrait of this unique thinker and the world from which he came. At the centre of the huge range of Leibniz's apparently miscellaneous endeavours, Antognazza reveals a single master project lending unity to his extraordinarily multifaceted life's work. Throughout the vicissitudes of his long life, Leibniz tenaciously (...) pursued the dream of a systematic reform and advancement of all the sciences. As well as tracing the threads of continuity that bound these theoretical and practical activities to this all-embracing plan, this illuminating study also traces these threads back into the intellectual traditions of the Holy Roman Empire in which Leibniz lived and throughout the broader intellectual networks that linked him to patrons in countries as distant as Russia and to correspondents as far afield as China. (shrink)

Harold Jeffreys' ideas on the interpretation of probability and epistemology are reviewed. It is argued that with regard to the interpretation of probability, Jeffreys embraces a version of logicism that shares some features of the subjectivism of Ramsey and de Finetti. Jeffreys also developed a probabilistic epistemology, characterized by a pragmatical and constructivist attitude towards notions such as ‘objectivity’, ‘reality’ and ‘causality’. 1 Introductory remarks 2 The interpretation of probability 3 Jeffreys' probabilistic epistemology.

Conceptions of evil have changed dramatically over time, and though humans continue to commit acts of cruelty against one another, today we possess a clearer, more moral way of analyzing them. In _Narrating Evil_, María Pía Lara explores what has changed in our understanding of evil, why the transformation matters, and how we can learn from this specific historical development. Drawing on Immanuel Kant's and Hannah Arendt's ideas about reflective judgment, Lara argues that narrative plays a key role in (...) helping societies acknowledge their pasts. Particular stories haunt our consciousness and lead to a kind of examination and dialogue that shape notions of morality. A powerful description of a crime can act as a filter, helping us to draw conclusions about what constitutes a moral wrong, and public debates over these narratives allow us to construct a more accurate picture of historical truth, leading to a better understanding of why such actions are possible. In building her argument, Lara considers Greek tragedies, Shakespeare's depictions of evil, Joseph Conrad's literary metaphors, and movies that portray human cruelty. Turning to such philosophers and writers as Jürgen Habermas, Walter Benjamin, Primo Levi, Giorgio Agamben, and Ariel Dorfman, Lara defines a reflexive relationship between an event, the narrative of the event, and the public reception of the narrative, and she proves that the stories of perpetrators and sufferers are always intertwined. The process of disclosure, debate, and the public fashioning of collective judgment are vital methods through which we make sense not only of new forms of cruelty but of past crimes as well. _Narrating Evil_ describes the steps of this process and why they are a crucial part of our attempt to build a different, more just world. (shrink)

In Kalaallisut (Eskimo-Aleut:Greenland) verbs inflect for illocutionary mood (declarative, interrogative, imperative, or optative). In addition, the language has an evidential (reportative) clitic which is compatible with all illocutionary moods and gives rise to a variety of readings. These<br>lecture notes exemplify the attested combinations and readings by means of a representative sample of mini-discourses and mini-dialogs.

The first part of the article deals with the theories of probability and induction put forward by Hans Reichenbach and Rudolf Carnap. It will be argued that, despite fundamental differences, Carnap's and Reichenbach's views on probability are closely linked with the problem of meaning generated by logical empiricism, and are characterized by the logico-semantical approach typical of this philosophical current. Moreover, their notions of probability are both meant to combine a logical and an empirical element. Of these, Carnap over the (...) years put more and more emphasis on the logical aspect, while for Reichenbach the empirical aspect has always been predominant. Seen in this light, Carnap's and Reichenbach's theories of probability can be taken to represent the Viennese and Berlinese mainstreams of the common logical empiricist approach. The second part of the article contrasts the position of these authors with that of the Bruno de Finetti, who is the main representative of the subjective interpretation of probability. Though the latter is sometimes associated with the position taken by Carnap in his late writings, it will be argued that the two are in many ways irreconcilable. (shrink)

Richard Jeffrey has labelled his philosophy of probability radical probabilism and qualified this position as Bayesian, nonfoundational and anti-rationalist. This paper explores the roots of radical probabilism, to be traced back to the work of Frank P. Ramsey and Bruno de Finetti.

Terence Horgan's "contextual semantics" is supposed to be a means to avoid unwanted ontological commitments, in particular commitments to non-physical objects, such as institutions, theories and symphonies. The core of contextual semantics is the claim that truth is correct assertibility, and that there are various standards of correct assertibility, the standards of "referential semantics" being only one among others. I am investigating the notions of correct assertibility,assertibility norms and indirect reference. I argue that closer inspection reveals that contextual semantics ultimately (...) amounts – contra Horgan's intentions – to a paraphrase strategy. I defend an ontological commitment to theories and symphonies. (shrink)

The book examines how Darwinism has been used to explain novelty and change in culture through the Darwinian approach to creativity and the theory of memes. The first claims that creativity is based on a Darwinian process of blind variation and selection, while the latter claims that culture is based on and explained by units - memes - that are similar to genes. Both theories try to describe and explain mind and culture by applying Darwinism by way of analogies. Kronfeldner (...) shows that the analogies involved in these theories lead to claims that give either wrong or at least no new descriptions or explanations of the phenomena at issue. Whereas the two approaches are usually defended or criticized on the basis that they are dangerous for our vision of ourselves, this book takes a different perspective: it questions the acuteness of these approaches. Darwinian theory is not like a dangerous wolf, hunting for our self image. Far from it, in the case of the two analogical applications addressed in this book, Darwinian theory is shown to behave more like a disoriented sheep in wolf's clothing. - A revised and much shortened version of a dissertation (2007, Darwinism, Memes and Creativity: A Critique of Analogical Reasoning from Nature to Culture). (shrink)

Certain emotional processes “bypass the will” and even awareness, whereas others arise due to the deliberative evaluation of objects, states, and events. It is important to differentiate between the automatic versus reflective origins of emotional processes, and sensory versus conceptual bases of diverse negative and positive emotions. A taxonomy of emotions based on different origins is presented. This taxonomy distinguishes between negative and positive automatic versus reflective emotions. The automatic emotions are connected with the (a) homeostatic and (b) hedonistic regulatory (...) mechanisms. The reflective emotions—uniquely human—are described in reference to deliberative processes and appraisals based on two types of conceptual and verbalized evaluative standards: (a) ideal self-standards and (b) general, axiological standards of good and evil. (shrink)

In _Kazimierz Twardowski: A Grammar for Philosophy_ Maria van der Schaar shows the importance of Twardowski’s method, his philosophical grammar, for both the Lvov-Warsaw School, and analytic philosophy today.

Se analiza el tratamiento que da Husserl en sus escritos tardíos al fenómeno-límite de la muerte, así como a la problemática que surge en la relación entre el hombre mundano y el sujeto trascendental. El acceso a la dimensión última de la subjetividad constituyente, que la reflexión sobre la muerte exige y motiva, revela una anonimia fundamental del yo, que pone en cuestión la posibilidad de la fenomenología de auto-fundamentarse siguiendo sus propios principios metodológicos: la ausencia de presupuestos y la (...) búsqueda de conocimiento a través de la intuición. (shrink)

The article presents two studies based on the assumption that the effectiveness of cognitive control depends on the subject’s type of emotional state. Inhibitory control is taken into account, as the basic determinant of the antisaccade reactions and the emotional Stroop effect. The studies deal with differentiation of emotions on the basis of their origin: automatic vs. reflective. According to the main assumption, automatic emotions are diffusive, and decrease the effectiveness of cognitive control. The hypothesis predicted that performance level of (...) both the Antisaccade Task and the Emotional Stroop Test would be lower in the automaticemotion eliciting condition than in the reflective-emotion eliciting condition. In two experimental studies, positive and negative emotions were elicited. The results support the predictions, regardless of the valence of emotions. (shrink)